Kyler Kuehn
Modern Apologetics
5/31/2004
In C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea, Victor Reppert seeks to rehabilitate an oft-unused argument against materialist philosophies, primarily as a rejoinder of sorts to Daniel Dennett, who asserted in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea that Darwinian naturalism is a “universal acid” which undermines rational belief in all other worldviews (particularly those based on some sort of theism). In his work, Reppert attempts to show that, given the basic tenets of rational scientific inference that undergird naturalism, it is in fact naturalism itself that is without a rational basis. Since naturalism is thus self-defeating, he argues that a “dualistic” view of causation—that is, a view where not only physical objects but also minds have causal efficacy--is in fact a better explanation for the world we observe. He begins his work by defending a variety of Lewis’s statements from historical and biographical ad hominem arguments, and he then goes on to defend Lewis’s apologetic strategy in general, making the important distinction among theistic defenses based on fideism, strong rationalism, and critical rationalism. From a stance of critical rationalism, Reppert continues with the main thrust of his argument, where he not only details Lewis’s original argument from reason, but also expands upon it in response to numerous critics (especially Anscombe and Beversluis). Several related formulations of the argument from reason are subsequently offered, all of which offer different facets of the same underlying philosophical assault on materialism. Finally, he provides a general treatment of the strengths and weaknesses of explanatory dualism, defending it against myriad objections. Throughout, he seeks to show that the our internal, common-sense perception of minds is not just a fantasy that is merely constructed by the brain as an explanatory tool, but is in fact a perception of a distinct metaphysical entity that is absolutely essential any sufficient explanation of humans’ rational powers.
Reppert does an admirable job of correcting errors in previous treatments of Lewis’s argument from reason, and he provides a rationally valid defense of that view based on numerous intriguing lines of thought. However, he stops short of providing a compelling case for the logical necessity of accepting the argument from reason, instead opting to merely defend it as one possible rational view. This stems from the nature of his case for the argument from reason, which he presents as an inference to the best explanation, as well as from his underlying epistemological principles, which have much in common with the Reformed epistemology of Kelly James Clark and others. Furthermore, his arguments against naturalistic accounts of rationality suffer from an overly broad treatment of crucially relevant evidence. For example, contemporary research in neurophysiology is often used as evidence in support of naturalism, but Reppert spends very little time engaging such ideas, with almost no mention of relevant literature on the subject. Thus, while his logical steps will be convincing to those who accept his premises, his nearly straw-man treatment of opposing viewpoints will ultimately elicit little discomfort in those who hold to reductionist views of rational thought. In the final analysis, one who hold to a view that an immaterial mind is distinct from a physical brain will find justification for his or her view, but he fails to provide a compelling case against those who view the mind as simply a fictitious model constructed the brain—a useful fiction, certainly, but with no greater ontologic status than unicorns.
Reppert begins his treatment of Lewis’s argument from reason by taking to task those who hold to an overly simplistic view of Lewis’s apologetics, and in particular have adopted an unflattering (and false) view of Lewis’s debate with Elizabeth Anscombe at the Oxford Socratic Club. One of the most important points raised by Reppert in his opening chapter is that Lewis’s argument, though published, ought to be treated as a work in progress. Lewis did not (indeed, could not) respond to every objection conceived against it in the decades since its original presentation, nor did he have all currently available philosophical resources at his disposal. So, argues Reppert, we do Lewis and his arguments a great disservice if we treat his initial (or even his revised) formulation as the “last word on the subject” (p.12). According to Reppert, Lewis’s genius consists not in providing us with an airtight, infallible argument to be wielded against anyone foolish enough to doubt it; instead, Reppert takes pains to show that Lewis provided his intellectual and spiritual descendants with an argument that could be further developed, thus spurring others on in their own rational considerations of the issue.
In the case of Lewis’s debate with Anscombe (and his subsequent apologetic arguments), Reppert sees a similar oversimplification at work. Though Lewis did eventually modify his argument from reason at least partially in response to Anscombe’s critique, he did not (as some asserted) abandon his apologetic task, nor did he give up on his foundational philosophical viewpoint. Important to Reppert’s discussion is the facile nature of critiques made of Lewis, particularly those that focus on biographical details from his life rather than on the content of his apologetic arguments. The fact that he apparently wrote less frequently on the subject after his encounter with Anscombe does not necessarily mean that the argument was no longer valid (much less does it indicate that Lewis himself had abandoned the argument). In fact, Reppert argues that current Christian thinkers need not concern themselves with Lewis’s (lack of) popularity within established philosophical circles; they need only determine how best to use his many sound apologetic arguments. And Reppert certainly feels that the argument from reason is one that can be (and has been) successfully used in defense of Christian theism, despite its lack of reception in the broader philosophical community.
In the same way, he convincingly refutes the notion that Lewis modified his views from a Platonist to an Ockhamist stance. Beversluis attempted to show that A Grief Observed presents a very different Lewis from all of his preceding works, and that this is due to Lewis’s movement to a view of God that makes his goodness appear arbitrary (termed “Ockhamism” by Beversluis). In contrast to Beversluis’s assertion, however, Reppert states, “a careful reading of A Grief Observed suggests that Lewis not only did not abandon his previous apologetic arguments, but in fact reaffirmed his arguments, including his argument against Ockhamism” (p. 22). While Lewis does express the concept of Ockhamism in this work (along with other, more disturbing views of God, such as dualism and the so-called “Cosmic Sadist” view), he ultimately rejects them as unsatisfactory. Not only does he maintain his consistent stance against materialism in A Grief Observed, his view of Ockhamism as self-stultifying is also clearly shown (p. 37-38):
The word good, as applied to Him [God], becomes meaningless: like abracadabra. We have no motive for obeying Him. Not even fear. It is true that we have His threats and promises. But why should we believe them? If cruelty is from his point of view “good”, telling lies may be “good” too. Even if they are true, what then? If His ideas of good are so different from ours, what he calls “Heaven” might be what we should call Hell, and vice versa. Finally, if reality is at its root so meaningless to us—or, putting it another way, if we are such total imbeciles—what is the point of trying to think either about God or about anything else? The knot comes undone when you try to pull it tight.
After dispensing with faulty understandings of Lewis’s apologetic stance, Reppert broadens the scope of his inquiry to deal with more general epistemic issues, in order to show where Lewis’s apologetic position fits within the spectrum of ideas. The first view described is fideism, which is comparable to the Presuppositional view of epistemology (and apologetics) held by Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, and others. As an example of this view, Reppert quotes the well-known televangelist Jimmy Swaggart, who opines (p. 29), “Man can’t use his mind to know the truth; if he uses his mind he just comes up with something stupid like the theory of evolution”. This captures the essence of fideism, which requires that one’s ultimate religious questions are not open to critical analysis by one’s mental faculties. The problems with mutually conflicting fideistic claims are obvious, and Reppert does not spill any additional ink reviewing them. Instead, moving on to strong rationalism, he describes the other extreme: the belief that our rational faculties are the sole arbiter of truth claims, so that claims that cannot be verified logically or empirically do not warrant our belief. Bertrand Russell is given as a paragon of strong rationalist beliefs, in that he explains away beliefs in the supernatural (and especially God) as the product of irrational fears. Interestingly, Reppert points out that claims to holding a “monopoly on rationality” are expressed on the theistic side as well, as shown by Josh McDowell’s statement in Evidence that Demands a Verdict that “a rejection of Christianity is usually not so much of the ‘mind’ as of the will, not so much ‘I can’t’ but ‘I won’t’”.
It is precisely here that Reppert’s own epistemological commitments begin to show themselves in earnest, and we begin to see some of his views that will cause difficulty for his attempt to effectively use Lewis’s argument from reason. He places both Russell and McDowell in the same camp, while he espouses a more “moderate” view that allows for both sides of the theism/atheism debate to be rationally acceptable. Indeed, it is a virtue of critical rationalism that it allows for epistemic uncertainty in one’s evidential claims, but Reppert takes this view to such an extreme that it precludes any possibility of offensive apologetics whatsoever. In doing so, he discounts ways of arguing that could be developed into a promising transcendent case for theism, along the lines of what William Lane Craig (or even, to a certain extent, John Frame) put forth in Five Views on Apologetics. According to Reppert’s view of critical rationalism, one can use empirical evidence to prove the rationality of a position by arguing within one’s accepted framework, but others may be equally rational in arguing for a contrary position, provided it is consistent with their accepted framework. Such a view is predicated upon the supposed difficulty of what J. P. Moreland in Love Your God with All Your Mind calls “the problem of the criterion”. Comparing philosophy to mathematics, Reppert states that in the latter “if two people come to different conclusions, we can go back to the beginning and see where the error might have been committed” (p. 34). On the other hand, philosophical reasoning allegedly has no such independent criteria that allow us to verify one view over another (p. 35):
Descartes began his philosophizing by rejecting every proposition that could possibly be doubted, including his beliefs in the external world, in hopes of finding some beliefs about which he could be absolutely certain and on which he could build his belief system. There is pretty much consensus in philosophy that Descartes’ project was a manifest failure and, what is more, attempts to revise the project by, say, starting from experience as opposed to reason were equally unsuccessful…What seems impossible is to achieve a neutral perspective from which to evaluate controversial philosophical claims.
Now there are two main problems with such a view. The first is that at the very least a de facto, operational answer is given to the problem of the criterion by every single thinking, observing being. Either one begins with experiential forms of knowledge and one builds a worldview (including a definition of knowledge) from that starting point, or one posits logically necessary criteria for what constitutes knowledge, and then one seeks experiences and observations that fulfill such criteria. Unfortunately for Reppert, his view proves too much; if both options that are able to solve the dilemma of the criterion are disallowed, then it is not the case that definitions of knowledge are up for grabs, with radically different worldviews resulting in internally “rational” beliefs. Rather, no view of knowledge whatsoever is valid! Only radical skepticism denies in principle the attainability of knowledge; however, his entire purpose for writing is that he believes that true and rationally justified beliefs (i.e. knowledge) are attainable. And it is important for our later considerations to point out that there is a sense in which even those who doubt the validity of knowledge in general make practical use of (even tentatively held) beliefs—though they would not call such a thing “knowledge”, of course.
The second problem with Reppert’s analysis of critical rationalism is that he vastly overestimates the necessity of “neutral” ground from which to analyze competing truth claims. While it is true that no finite being can attain an unbiased “view from nowhere”, Reppert errs when he thinks such a view is necessary for clearly discerning the truth in any given situation. Yes, psychological effects can influence one’s beliefs, but they do not utterly overturn and negate one’s innate rational capabilities (once again, Reppert ironically appears to be attacking one of the foundational pillars of his argument from reason—namely, that truth actually exists and is knowable by humans). What is necessary, then, is not “neutral” ground, but instead common ground between disputants in any argument. In an adversarial situation, such as within a court of law, both the prosecution and the defense have a bias in that they want their own position to be true, but they have a mutually agreed upon framework within which to present their respective arguments. Indeed, the common presumption is that our legal system works precisely because both sides are biased towards their own view, and will thus work with all possible skill to prove their position true and their intellectual opponent’s position false. A disinterested defense attorney leads not to justice, but to a mistrial!
Since Reppert merely requires that his position be defensible given his assumptions, we will see that his argument, while valid, will not ultimately prove convincing to skeptics unless the further step is made to justify the premises of his arguments. This also colors his view of Lewis’s arguments, such that he seeks to explain away Lewis’s more confrontational statements as not being truly representative of his actual views. But if Reppert’s definition of critical rationalism lacks the clarity to distinguish between rationally acceptable arguments (valid solely within one’s framework) and rationally compelling arguments (that hold across all reasonable frameworks), then he will of course be at a loss to fit Lewis’s bold claims of exclusive rationality into a more tentative “critical rationalist” stance. But this is only a definitional problem for Reppert, not a consistency problem for Lewis.
Proceeding to the centerpiece of his defense of Lewis’s argument from reason, Reppert now begins to work out (in “dialogue” with Elizabeth Anscombe) an acceptable form of the argument. The primary foil against which he pits a mind-first view of reality is materialism (used somewhat interchangeably with physicalism or naturalism, once the distinctions are shown to be inconsequential to his purposes). Materialism requires that all observed phenomena (including what we perceive to be rational thought) be explained purely in terms of physical causes; for example, he quotes Dennett as stating, “Darwin explains a world of final causes and teleological laws with a principle that is independent of ‘meaning’ or ‘purpose’” (p. 49). Relative to views of mental states, materialism can be of the eliminative form, which denies that mental states exist at all; or it describes mental states in terms of physical states of the brain; or it can allow mental states to supervene on physical states, so long as any difference in mental state corresponds to a difference in a physical state (though the mental state may not itself be a physical state). All of these physicalist views deny the efficacy of mental causation apart from physical causation, and thus they all run afoul of the argument from reason. This is the case, Reppert argues, because purely physical causation is insufficient to explain the qualities of humans’ rational thought processes. We infer. We believe. We follow the steps of logical arguments. And we are rationally justified in doing so. However, if materialism is true, then “all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of irrational causes”. But since “no belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of irrational causes”, materialism is shown to be false, because it is our experience that we do in fact make rational inferences (p.55ff).
Here Reppert engages with Anscombe’s critiques in three specific areas. First, he acknowledges that Lewis’s initial formulation of the argument supposed that materialism leads to “irrational causes”, a claim which Anscombe rejects. Reppert quickly proposes a more adequate form of the argument that doesn’t require materialism to have irrational causes, but only non-rational ones. Restated in these terms, the argument retains its validity. Second, Anscombe applies a “paradigm case” argument to Lewis’s claims, and shows that valid reasoning can only be applied if we have prior knowledge of what “valid” and “invalid” signify. Only when valid and invalid are already defined does it make sense to distinguish between the two in any particular case; asking “Are all my beliefs false?” renders any form of argumentation invalid both for the materialist and the theist. Reppert quickly agrees that, if it is presented as a “skeptical threat” argument, the problem of the paradigm case “is a difficulty that the naturalist and the supernaturalist share equally” (p. 59). If Lewis’s argument could be so easily subject to a tu quoque rejoinder, his view would be fail at just the same place that the materialists’ does. But here Reppert takes advantage of the explanatory power of mind-first reasoning over purely physical causation. Stated as an inference to the best explanation rather than a skeptical threat claim, rational thought poses a problem only for materialist views of the mind. If we assume that rational processes do in fact occur, we have phenomena in need of explanation, but by hypothesis we need worry no more about the intransigent skeptic.
But is Lewis’s argument really caught on the horns of a dilemma? Must proponents of this view follow Reppert in conceding the point that one must presuppose the absolute validity of logical reasoning in order to avoid the universal acid of skepticism? Is there no further evidence one can bring to bear to support what has now become the starting premise of the argument from reason? Here the strength of Reppert’s analysis falters; from this point on his prior epistemic commitments define the direction in which his argument will (and will not) proceed. Specifically, he relies upon his earlier commitment that in order to be considered rational, one needs only to show the validity of one’s point within one’s prior philosophical framework. To those who accept the premise of his argument, then, the subsequent stages of his argument can be shown to be valid, but it bears pointing out here that he has conceded enormous ground by retreating to a nearly Postmodern “true-for-me” construal of his position. This is consistent with his view that the definition of “rational” can be person-relative, but the consequence is that he lacks all motivation for engaging his opponents in the very arena where most of the philosophical “action” truly is! He does not engage with the reductionists who view the mind as a mere construct of the brain, or with those who take a pragmatic (rather than an absolute) view of logic and rationality. Here in particular his mistaken view of “neutral” vs. “common” ground limits the effectiveness of his argument: though there are many who agree on an absolute view of rationality, he misses out on the opportunity for cultivating an even broader base of common ground from which to argue and debate. Would such arguments ultimately be successful, or would some form of skepticism always allow one to avoid the consequences of the argument from reason? What about the support for materialist views of the mind adduced from the evidences of neurophysiology? Can the argument from reason illuminate any illicit question-begging in such a stance, or can it in some other way overcome the materialist arguments? We do not know, because he does not engage his intellectual opponents on such grounds. Such avoidance will come back to haunt his analysis again and again.
Nevertheless, once constrained to work solely within the bounds of his assumptions, Reppert proceeds to refute Anscombe’s final remaining criticism based on the different types of “full” explanations that can be given for any set of circumstances. She differentiates between 1) naturalistic causes, 2) logical causes, 3) psychological causes, and 4) personal history explanations. She alleges that such different explanations are mutually compatible, given materialism, despite Lewis’s assertions to the contrary. In particular, she focuses on psychological causes, or reasons-explanations, and attempts to show that they do not interfere with the causal adequacy of physical explanations. However, Reppert reiterates the modifications Lewis made to his argument subsequent to the initial Socratic Club debate, modifications which rendered Anscombe’s critiques invalid. Specifically, Lewis highlighted his new stance based on the important difference between cause-effect relationships and ground-consequent relationships. As examples of these distinct ideas, Reppert puts forth two “because” statements: “Grandfather is ill because he ate lobster yesterday”, and “Grandfather is ill because he hasn’t gotten up yet” (p.63). The first evinces an ontological relationship of cause preceding effect, while the second shows an epistemological relationship whereby one apprehends the cause from the effect. This second statement is a type of rational inference that proceeds in a different fashion from a cause-effect argument; nevertheless, the perception of a ground-consequent relationship can produce changes in one’s beliefs. In other words, rational inference has causal powers relative to one’s mental states, independent of the strict physical cause-effect relationship. Or, as Reppert states (p. 65), “The idea of being convinced by something seems to imply that reasons are playing a causal role…[but] if reasons cannot be part of the explanation of how we come to hold beliefs as a matter of personal history, then human rationality as we ordinarily understand it simply does not exist.” Thus, according to the consistent materialist, non-physical “full” explanations can satisfy one’s curiosity, but they do not answer the question of “why?” at the most basic level. So physical causes must be the only acceptable basic explanation, but suddenly other explanations appear to have causal adequacy as well! Though materialists cannot accept such a conclusion, anti-realism is not an acceptable escape route for (most) materialists, since many of them believe materialism is a true explanation of the state of affairs in the world. However, there is once again the unanswered (and unacknowledged) issue of the eliminativist or the pragmatic materialist, who does not need to decide if materialism is true or if logical reasoning is universally valid, but only operates under the assumption of the usefulness of these two ideas. Apart from this (not inconsequential) caveat, Reppert shows, then, that all other types of explanations for the process of rational inference that are proffered by Anscombe either conflict with a materialist view of cause-and-effect relationships or are in an important sense non-basic. So he concludes—despite the gaping hole in the live options he considers—that the major critiques of Lewis are shown to be invalid; it yet remains for him to make his own positive case that materialism is in fact incompatible with human rationality.
To this task he devotes the latter half of C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea, developing in great detail six formulations of the argument from reason that focus either on the existence of certain mental phenomena or on the causal efficacy of such phenomena. First is the argument from intentionality (p. 74ff):
1) If naturalism is true, then there is no fact of the matter as to what someone’s thought or statement is about.
2) But there are facts about what someone’s belief is about. (Implied by the existence of rational inference.)
3) Therefore, naturalism is false.
This conclusion certainly follows from the premises he has stated, and, encouragingly, he does acknowledge the issues raised by (at least some of) those who will not accept his premises—specifically, the eliminative reductionists. But unfortunately, he acknowledges them only to summarily dismiss their claims as irrelevant: “…eliminative materialists maintain that there are no beliefs. The obvious question that occurs to most people when they hear this sort of thing is to ask, ‘You expect me to believe that?’” (p. 75). While he points out that the eliminative reductionist must concede that humans are all “massively deceived”, he is too quick to assume that this “undermines the foundations of the very scientific enterprise upon which it is based” (p. 76). While such a position could ultimately be defended, it would be extremely beneficial if he were to in fact engage in such a defense here, rather than provide a one-paragraph conclusion to an argument made in absentia. Once again, he feels no need to engage at length the arguments of those who are outside his paradigm; they may or may not be rational on their own terms (to say nothing of being rational from a more restricted base of commonly-held views), but that is of no immediate concern to him.
The second argument advanced by Reppert is the argument from truth (p. 77):
1) If naturalism is true, then no states of the person can be either true or false.
2) Some states of the person can be either true or false. (Implied by the existence of rational inference).
3) Therefore, naturalism is false.
Lewis states this succinctly in Christian Reflections (p. 64), “to talk about one bit of matter being true of another seems to me to be nonsense.” Following on Lewis’s idea, Reppert supposes that 1) is a consequence of naturalism and 2) is necessary for the scientific enterprise to get off the ground, but there are no refutations of the potential arguments against premise 2 (or against its necessity to the practice of science). Once again, the conclusion of the argument follows necessarily from the premises, and once again the eliminativist view is held up as seriously flawed. But as it is not engaged at great length, the believer is left with rationalizations of already-held views, and the skeptic remains unswayed.
Third is the argument from mental causation. This harkens back to his earlier argument contra Anscombe, that causal efficacy can be attributed to the propositional content of beliefs, and not just to the physical manifestations of belief. That is, there need not be a specific 1:1 mapping between physical patterns in the brain and the actual content of one’s beliefs. Fourth is the causal efficacy not of specific propositions, but of the laws of logical reasoning considered as a whole. Since our experience shows that the (non-physical) laws of logic do impact one’s beliefs, they offer similar evidence of the inadequacy of materialism. Fifth is the argument from the existence of a “self”, a unified whole that ties together memories and experiences, including the experience of premises and conclusions that comprise rational inference. Such a “metaphysically unified entity” is allegedly inexplicable on materialist terms. For all of these arguments, however, questioning either (or both) of the premises means that Reppert’s conclusions need not be accepted.
The sixth and final argument serves as ground zero for the ongoing tension between Reppert’s valid (though arguably, not sound) reasoning and the position of materialism. The argument assumes that our faculties “reliably reveal the nonapparent character of the world” (p. 85). This is precisely the point at issue in all of the preceding lines of argumentation. Can the purely physical motion of atoms in the brain yield reliable information about the external world? And if the information gained is not reliable, what then? For some versions of materialism, the information gained by the brain through the process called rational inference need not be utterly reliable; if it evolved as a tool for survival, that is enough. Sometimes it provides an accurate account of one’s environment (though sometimes it does not), and that is sufficient for it to be appropriated as a useful tool. Brain states are influenced by apprehension of the external world, and thus are not totally devoid of pragmatic purpose, even if no ultimate ground for a belief in rational inference exists. In his exposition of this argument, and indeed through the final two chapters of his book devoted to this topic, he takes only marginal interest in such issues. Instead, he is content to advance the argument against materialism given the premise of the reliability of the rational process.
Thus, in the chapter entitled “Explanatory Dualism”, Reppert continues his case for theism as the best explanation for rationality, showing that (at least some type of) mind-first causation does provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of reliable rational inference. Investigating (and refuting) claims to the contrary, he shows that materialism does not have sufficient explanatory resources to account for rationality. Initially, he argues that William Hasker’s and Terence Horgan’s various attempted explanations using counterfactual claims may really be “implausible and weird”—that is, not pertinently similar to our world. He then continues by countering the claims of A.J. Ayer that laws of logic are simply about our experience and how our ideas are related to one another. Here he invokes Adams’ arguments from his essay “Divine Necessity” to show that materialist accounts on these terms still do not remove the mystery of rational thought:
…if necessary truths reveal features or relations of thoughts, they reveal features or relations of thoughts that we have not yet thought, as well as those that we have thought. If I know that modus ponens is a valid argument form, I know that it will be valid for thoughts I think tomorrow as well as for thoughts that I have thought today. If this is a knowledge of properties and relations of the thoughts involved, then the question of how I can know properties and relations of thoughts I have not yet experienced seems as pressing as the question of how I could know properties and objects outside my mind that I have not experienced. The retreat to abstract or mental objects does not help to explain what we want to explain.
But here Adams is operating under the same presuppositions as Reppert, and is thus subject to the same critique. There are physicalist explanations that take into account abstract thought (or thinking “in the absence of” the object of thought). Such explanations take into account humans’ common modes of thought—which, presumably, are simply models developed by the brain for gaining a handle on the external world—but they do not require that rational thought must have the (ontological) quality of reliability. Despite the shortcomings of this partial defense, Reppert does provide an interesting critique of explanations for logical thought derived from “survival value”. Using the example of the desert tribes of the Yahvites and the Baalites (p. 97), he shows that survival value is not necessarily a complete (naturalistic) explanation for observed phenomena. Survival value can explain their persistence, but not their origin:
Suppose two desert tribes, the Yahvites and the Baalites, are competing for scarce resources in the desert. The Yahvites receive periodic manna from heaven and survive, passing on their genes. The Baalites, on the other hand, die out, because they receive no manna from heaven. Now the fact that the ability to receive manna from heaven has survival value does not mean that the explanation of their survival is naturalistic.
So those who advert to “survival value” as an explanation need to do more work to show how such an explanation might be construed in naturalistic terms, and Reppert is right to point that out. Certainly more work must be done by proponents of naturalistic theories of mind to explain how random mutation (for example) could give rise to the brain in the first place. But now one is left with somewhat of a dilemma: if one simply assumes with Reppert the non-physical nature of rational thought, is he or she not committing a variation on the “God of the Gaps” fallacy? On the other hand, if one simply holds forth materialist philosophy as a sort of “promissory note” for future explanations, is not a “Materialism-of-the-Gaps” fallacy being committed? On the level of presuppositions, are both options truly equal, or is one more defensible than the other?
In his final chapter, Reppert does acknowledge the need for an explanatory ground by asking what counts as a basic explanation, but he ultimately leaves the deeper issue of incommensurate presuppositions unresolved. Materialists, of course, reject the notion that supernatural causes are any type of explanation at all. As Parsons asserts in his essay “Defending Objectivity”, “Creationist ‘explanations’ [are] mere markers for our ignorance, placeholders for explanations we hope to someday get.” Reppert rightly points out the “scientific fideism” implicit in such a charge, since assuming that non-physical explanations are invalid truly is begging the very question at issue. Proclaiming supernaturalistic explanations of the mind (or of God) to be shot through with “mystery” likewise does not faze him, because there are in fact potential answers to many of the alleged mysteries. Further, such explanations may in fact be basic, that is, not admitting of a more fundamental layer of explanation—something that the materialist likewise must face. Thus Reppert argues (p. 122), “Explaining reason in terms of the inherent rationality of God is no more question-begging than explaining physical states in terms of prior physical states.” On one final occasion, he flirts with modern arguments from neurophysiology that seek to explain mental states in terms of physical states, but as before, the one argument presented (regarding the phenomenon of visual agnosia) is not treated to a sufficient discussion. Is the evidence sound? Is the physicalist interpretation truly dangerous to a theistic worldview? Or is it simply an instance of the illegitimate smuggling of materialist presuppositions into otherwise neutral data? Reppert ultimately does not feel the need to step beyond his own framework to address such concerns.
In conclusion, Reppert’s work provides cogent support for the
validity of Lewis’s argument from reason, along with strong refutations of the
many critiques leveled against it throughout recent decades. He shows that several of Lewis’s critics do
not take his evidences seriously on their own terms, instead preferring to
dismiss them in favor of historical or biographical (“He wasn’t even a
professional philosopher!”) considerations.
He shows that such ad hominem fallacies are particularly
egregious in the analyses of Lewis’s interactions with Elizabeth Anscombe. Once these issues are adequately addressed,
he proceeds with a more general analysis of epistemic positions, particularly
those of fideism, strong rationalism, and critical rationalism. Though he identifies problems with fideism
and strong rationalism, he unfortunately mischaracterizes the potential of
critical rationalism, and thus he severely restricts the applicability of his
entire apologetic enterprise. As he
proceeds with the details of Lewis’s argument from reasons (and his own
extensions therefrom), we see numerous instances of this restriction at
work. Reppert does a very thorough and
convincing job of proving, through several parallel arguments, the logical
necessity of his apologetic if one agrees upon the absolute validity of
rationality. Given his epistemic
commitments, perhaps that is all one can expect. But there is still a stronger case to be made against those who
would argue that the mind is a fictitious entity created by the brain, and
there is much contrary evidence left unrefuted by taking such a narrow view of
what constitutes a “rationally held” belief.
Bibliography
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